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Abstract 
The United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union has triggered a variety of forms 
of political engagement among EU nationals living in the UK. Our research, carried out in the 
North West of England, an area that has received little attention so far, demonstrates that 
the result of the 2016 Referendum sparked a new awareness of public discourse, has led to 
the emergence of new political and discursive attitudes and strategies, as well as persuasive 
reflexivity and incipient activism on the part of EU nationals. This article thus contributes to 
the existing literature on political engagement by analysing EU nationals’ cognitive, discursive 
and pro/re-active engagements with Brexit. 
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Introduction 
 
Several Brexit-related research clusters have emerged in the wake of the United Kingdom 
(UK) referendum for the membership of the European Union (EU). Many authors have been 
preoccupied with the reasons for which the UK voted to end its membership of the EU, such 
as Euroscepticism or immigration (Goodwin and Milazzo 2017, Dennison and Geddes 2018). 
Some have attempted to predict what the future might look like in the aftermath of Brexit, 
focussing on economic and legal aspects, but also on social divisions (Ford and Goodwin 2017, 
Evans and Menon 2017). There have been comprehensive analyses of the media coverage of 
the referendum campaign (Seaton 2016, Jackson, Thorsen and Wring 2016, Moore and 
Ramsey 2017). A supranational approach is also taking shape, looking at the effect of Brexit 
on the world order, the economic system, and globalization more generally, while also 
comparing the UK with other countries affected by populism (Inglehart and Norris 2016, 
Colantone and Stanig 2018). 
 
Within this emerging framework most ethnographic accounts of EU nationals in the UK 
precede the Referendum, many going back to the aftermath of the 2004 EU enlargement, and 
most focus on just one migrant group, particularly migrants from Poland (Garapich 2016). 
More importantly, even fewer tackle political discursive engagement and reflexivity; Bell and 
Domecka’s 2018 work, for example, precedes Brexit and only documents Polish engagements. 
This article is part of a number that are beginning to emerge in relation to this topic, although 
the majority still only charter one community (McGhee, Moreh and Vlachantoni 2017, 
Botterill 2018, Fleming 2018, Duda-Mikulin 2019, Rzepnikowska 2019). An exception is Lulle, 
Moroşanu and King’s (2018) research, which included Irish, Italian and Romanian young 
2 
 
people in London looking at their tactics of belonging before and after the referendum. A 
special issue of the Population, Space and Place journal dedicated to the ‘experiences and 
impacts of Brexit from two perspectives: EU citizens in Britain and British citizens currently 
residing in Europe’ (Botterill, McCollum and Tyrrell 2019) also lacked a political engagement 
focus. Our article aims to complement the existing academic landscape, by capturing the 
voices of EU nationals living in the North West of England (an area that has received less 
attention, apart from Rzepnikowska’s study of Polish migrant women in Manchester) and, 
through them, to demonstrate that the result of the referendum sparked a renewed 
awareness of public discourse, the emergence of new political and discursive attitudes and 
strategies, persuasive reflexivity and incipient activism on the part of EU nationals.  
 
Fifty in-depth interviews (one hour on average) with EU nationals and key informants and two 
focus groups were conducted between October 2017 and September 2018 in Liverpool and 
Southport. The two locations were chosen with the aim of providing a diverse sample of 
participants, who were recruited via the snow-balling technique. Nationals of eighteen EU 
countries were included in the project. Liverpool has a long history of migration, diversity and 
political engagement (Foos and Bischof 2019). As a large city, it hosts many businesses and 
three universities, so it provided access to EU migrants (from countries such as Cyprus, 
Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland, Romania and Spain) with a professional status and higher 
education levels (among them a psychotherapist, a university lecturer, an IT specialist, an 
AirBnB host, an NGO worker, students). At the time of the interviews they had resided in the 
UK for between two to eighteen years.  
 
Southport, on the other hand, is a much smaller coastal town, which has seen many EU 
arrivals after the EU enlargement in 2004. At the time of the interviews the participants had 
been UK residents for between one to fourteen years. Many still had limited English language 
skills. EU nationals in Southport tended to be mainly from Southern and Eastern Europe 
(Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal) and, as Southport borders the agricultural lands 
of Lancashire, many worked in nearby farms and packing factories. Some participants in 
Southport were recruited with the help of the Migrant Workers Sefton Community charity, 
who also provided translators. Liverpool voted against the UK leaving the EU in the 
referendum, while Southport was split in half (Bona-Sou 2016). Subsequently, in the general 
election of 2017, Southport changed from a Liberal Democrat to a Conservative parliamentary 
representation, signalling a change in political attitudes during the Referendum campaign and 
its aftermath, while Liverpool remained a Labour stronghold.  
 
The present paper looks more specifically at how EU nationals began to cultivate pro/re-
active, cognitive and discursive engagements, leading to increased political activism at a 
micro-political level. After June 2016 they problematized the issues at stake and fostered an 
emerging sense of collectiveness, mostly symbolic, but occasionally radicalized to the level of 
actively seeking critical reflexivity and even action. Through critical language, as well as 
displays of rationalized political choices, EU nationals began to forge a common purpose, 
express political attitudes, and elaborate new strategies of engagement.  
 
In charting these political engagements, this research differs from studies that focus either on 
migrants’ involvement in homeland politics (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003, Ragazzi 2014), usually 
in relation to homeland development (Kleist 2008, Ostergaard-Nilsen 2009) or conflict 
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resolution (Koinova 2018), or on migrants’ transnational engagement in both homeland and 
host country politics (Escobar 2006, Bermudez 2010, Tintori 2011), which might have a 
negative impact on migrants’ integration into the host country (Guarnizo et al. 2003). This 
article looks specifically at EU nationals’ engagement in the UK, during certain political events, 
which will affect them in a variety of ways, but with little opportunity on their part to impact 
and influence. In contrast to research that argues that usually migrants become activists at 
specific times, such as contested national elections or natural disasters (Guarnizo et al. 2003, 
1238), this article problematizes this assumption by charting migrants’ political engagement 
as a continuum of various and fluctuating expressions. 
 
Some researchers report on the role of immigrant organizations in civic engagement (Horta 
and Malheiros 2006, Pilati 2011) and some emphasise the importance of ethnic associations 
in building social capital for migrant communities (Fennema and Tillie 1999). Fennema and 
Tillie’s now classic study looked at four migrant groups in Amsterdam and their political 
participation (voting, lobbying, attending association and neighbourhood meetings), but also 
their cultivation of civic engagement, through mainly consuming media (Fennema and Tillie 
1999, 720). Although Fennema and Tillie’s study is enlightening from the point of view of what 
constitutes engagement and participation for migrant groups, few of our participants were 
part of community-based organizations and these were usually baby/toddler or church 
groups, with no political remit. This may have to do with the more scattered distribution of 
EU nationals outside of London, smaller ethnic groups of European origin in the North West 
of England and the fact that much of the activity of consuming news and expressing political 
views has now moved online. In this context, it was important to capture individuals’ political 
engagements, in the absence of an ethnic organizational structure and coherent activist 
campaigns.  Whether they defined themselves as primarily nationals or Europeans, whether 
they self-identified as diasporans, expats, migrants or labourers, or a mix of the above, 
whether they were divided by levels of political knowledge and education, different 
professional or family circumstances, the practices they engaged in had an agency seeking 
quality.  
 
Our analysis focuses on EU nationals’ ‘practical reasoning’ (Fairclough and Fairclough 2011, 
244), on the way persuasive reasoning or arguments are constructed in discourse and become 
evidence of critical and political thinking. As Fairclough and Fairclough argue (2011), 
reasoning and argumentation sit at the foundation of a deliberative democracy. Their 
approach erodes the dichotomy between reason and emotion to reiterate that desires, 
passion and values are ‘necessary premises in practical arguments: without this motivational 
and emotional investment, no belief could prompt us to act one way or another’ (Fairclough 
and Fairclough 2011, 245). This approach helps us demonstrate that EU nationals in the North 
West of England began to engage politically in the aftermath of the 2016 Referendum and 
thus contribute to the rather limited literature in migration studies on migrants’ political 
engagement. We also argue that this engagement was mainly pro/re-active, cognitive and 
discursive, which allows us to expand the existing literature on political engagement and in 
particular the work of Ekman and Amnå 2012, Zani and Barrett 2012 and Barrett and Zani 
2015.   
 
 
Migrants’ (Political) Engagement 
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Engagement denotes an individual’s interactions with ‘political institutions, processes and 
decision-making’ with, although not always, the ‘intent’ to influence them (Barrett and Zani 
2015, 4). In this interpretation, engagement crosses over into the realm of participation, 
which nonetheless differs from engagement in its emphasis on action, influence and change, 
but could be conceived as being ‘a manifest form of engagement’ (Montgomery 2015, 74). 
Participation, in its turn, could mean a myriad of things, including loud-voiced (strikes, public 
protests, party membership) and low-voiced protest acts (donations, boycotts and petition 
support), according to Myrberg and Rogstad (2011). However, it is important, as Montgomery 
points out, to steer away from narrow conceptions of political participation, which emphasize 
activism and the exercise of political rights, as it could obscure ‘unconventional forms of 
political participation, various sources of civil engagement and the recourse to utilise new 
technologies in participation and engagement.’ (Montgomery 2015, 74)  
As Barrett and Zani observe in a similar fashion, individuals consume media, discuss politics 
with friends and family and connect with like-minded individuals online, and thus can be 
‘cognitively or affectively engaged’ without being ‘behaviourally engaged’ (Barrett and Zani 
2015, 4). ‘Psychological’ engagement and participation would include, for example, being 
‘politically attentive and knowledgeable’, being willing to engage in protest activities, have 
some identification with a group or cause and perhaps being able to perceive injustice (Barrett 
and Zani 2015, 10). Following the news or discussing politics with peers can also be considered 
forms of political engagement (Zani and Barrett 2012, 274). As Montgomery too observes, 
being engaged by political issues is ‘beneficial and may be the precursor to participation’ 
(Montgomery 2015, 75).  
 
Research by Ekman and Amnå (2012) and Barrett and Zani (2015) also discusses non-
participation and disengagement. Ekman and Amnå’s engagement typology differentiates 
between passive non-engagement by citizens who do not find politics interesting and active 
non-participation on the part of citizens who are disillusioned with the political class (2012, 
294). Barrett and Zani also make the point that some individuals are ‘quietly apolitical while 
others may be actively and strongly antipolitical’ (2015, 7). 
 
In the case of EU nationals in the UK, we can trace all the above manifestations of political 
engagement and disengagement. Our study focuses more specifically on pro/re-active 
engagements with political events, which had underlying emotive reasons, cognitive 
engagement evident in increased news and legal information consumption, and discursive 
engagement, through openly criticizing politicians and media. However, our participants also 
chose to act by joining political organizations or applying for naturalization. EU nationals more 
widely have also responded to mobilization calls and have attended meetings organized by 
associations such as Another Europe, the3million or People’s Vote and have participated in 
demonstrations and public protests. EU nationals in the North West have also voiced both 
apolitical and antipolitical attitudes, and some of these are also evident in the discussion to 
follow.   
 
Other studies have also started to conceptualize EU nationals’ political engagement in the UK 
around the time of the referendum and its aftermath. Garapich (2016) showed how Poles in 
London mobilized social and cultural capital (rich historical traditions in the UK, ‘whiteness’ 
and neoliberal work ethics) for meaning-making in the run-up to the Referendum. Bell and 
5 
 
Domecka’s work with Poles in Belfast (2018) focused on the relationship between gender and 
place to prove that migration can be transformative and that reflexivity and adaptation to 
local circumstances was a way of obtaining agency and therefore the capacity and capability 
to act (Bell and Domecka 2018, 867). 
McGhee, Moreh and Vlachantoni (2017) also focused on the Polish community, but their 
survey data looked at ‘civic integration’ via applications for residency status, motivated by 
migrants’ assessment of their own rights (McGhee, Moreh and Vlachantoni 2017, 2112). Kate 
Botterill’s work with Polish nationals in Scotland (2018) detailed community engagement and 
the role of community organizations and events as well as online community spaces for Poles 
living in urban areas. This research was mostly inward looking and did not chart engagements 
outside the community. Rzepnikowska’s research with Polish migrant women in Manchester 
before and after the referendum (2019), on the other hand, highlighted how the Polish 
experience of racism and hostility, which intensified in the context of Brexit, was seen as an 
outcome of deprivation within working class communities, but migrants also blamed the 
media and political discourse. Lulle, Moroşanu and King’s research with Irish, Italians and 
Romanians in London discussed tactics as a form of resistance and agency in the aftermath of 
the referendum (2018, 2124) and captured migrants’ reflections about adapting to new 
circumstances in the context of perceived loss of rights and status. Most of the above 
publications highlight the emotional impact of Brexit, as well as the adaptation strategies 
deployed by EU nationals, however there is limited focus on political reflexivity and 
engagement.  
This paper sees political engagement as a composite of various stances and actions that fall 
within the realm of micropolitics, understood as informal power used by individuals and 
groups to attempt to influence change, resulting from perceived differences between 
individuals or groups, coupled with the conscious or unconscious motivation to protect 
themselves and others (Blase 1991, 11). Consequently, we deploy the term ‘political 
engagement’ to discuss a range of attitudes and behaviours displayed by EU nationals as a 
reaction to Brexit. We categorize these engagements as pro/re-active, cognitive and 
discursive. In so doing, we expand on Barrett and Zani’s work (2015), which focuses on 
cognitive, affective and behavioural engagement, and also Ekman and Amnå’s typology 
(2012), neither of which mention discursive engagement. Our research sees discursive 
engagement as the ability of EU nationals to use language strategically, to display emotions, 
reflexivity and criticism, and signal their intention to participate symbolically or actively in 
political acts. We also consider the decision to not engage a political act and the ability to 
voice this as a form of discursive disengagement. These forms of engagements are discussed 
and illustrated in more detail in the following two sections.   
 
Emotion, Awareness, Critical Reflexivity, Activism 
In the aftermath of the EU referendum result, EU nationals became pro-active in finding 
political information because of the absence in public discourse of any legal and practical 
certainties and the lack of trust in public officials. ‘What [are] they going to do? There is no 
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plan. There’s no plan’, complained Agnieszka, while Faith simply conceded: ‘we’re still 
nowhere in terms of negotiations.’ Rhetorical questions and negativity (‘nowhere’, ‘no plan’) 
show an emotional response to uncertainty, which led to the quest for certainty via 
information about legal options in order to better plan for the future. There is clear evidence 
of emotional engagement, practical reasoning and argumentation resulting from an 
awareness of the renewed attention EU nationals received in political discourse. Some 
participants observed that they were being made an object of negotiations, without being 
given a voice and they used the metaphor of the ‘bargaining chip’ to express their criticism: ‘I 
feel that the UK is using the EU nationals here and the UK nationals abroad as a bargaining 
chip’, commented Jelena; ‘I have to be prepared for the eventualities and talking about the 
tactics of politics seems to be from the British side to keep us in uncertainty because we are 
bargaining chips,’ declared Dagmar. The metaphor of the ‘bargaining chip’ effectively 
described the objectification of EU nationals during the negotiations but was also used as 
proof of the government’s tactics by both Jelena and Dagmar.  
Hypothetical questions were often used to show an emotional investment in political events, 
a way of highlighting the contradictions apparent in government policy and an ability to 
project persuasive reasoning. Katarzyna expressed her frustration at the psychological 
makeup of a country that had, over the years, provided support to migrants and designed 
integration policies, only to then reject migration altogether: ‘after all those years of changing 
the rules and making this society easier for foreigners […] why would you go through all these 
efforts if actually you don’t want those people here? It doesn’t make any sense, you know?’  
The participants showed a developed critical reflexivity, evident in observations about 
political and legal positions, the comparing and contrasting of options and the calculation of 
outcomes. Such instances show proactive, cognitive and discursive engagements. Political 
events triggered emotional reactions that were followed by active attempts to become 
informed and knowledgeable about the ensuing process, followed by rationalization through 
discourse. Another example of this process is blame assignation, which indicated the ability 
to identify media and politicians as facilitators of Brexit. Aleksi commented: ‘it’s all about Tory 
Party internal politics, really,’ while Federico noted: ‘It was more the Tories needing to solve 
this internal issue.’ Such views also displayed practical reasoning, because they pinpointed 
the cause of the perceived problem, while implicitly looking for a solution. 
The media was assessed as being ‘very politicised. It’s even not pretending to be neutral, and 
there’s so much of just junk newspapers’, explained Aleksi. ‘It’s due to Daily Mail headlines 
[…] I feel like they’ve been kind of fooled into it,’ said Agnieszka, who also used the deictic 
‘they’ to subsume the English under one banner and provide evidence of polarization. Lina 
summed up the feelings of many EU nationals: ‘English people do not know what this means. 
Why they need to go out or [stay] in. They do not have a lot of information. If they had more 
information, maybe they would not have voted for Brexit. […] It’s a mess!’ Lina summed up 
the feelings of many EU nationals: ‘English people do not know what this means. Why they 
need to go out or [stay] in. They do not have a lot of information. If they had more 
information, maybe they would not have voted for Brexit. […] It’s a mess!’ We see again here 
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the strategy of labelling ‘the English’ and separating them from an assumed ‘us’ or ‘not 
English, therefore European’.  
Caitlin, an Irish national, criticized her English mother-in-law in similarly uncompromising 
terms: ‘they are Daily Mail readers, so they are brainwashed basically […] they don’t want to 
see the bigger picture of things and they don’t obviously care about whether my husband will 
stay in employment or where the heck my son’s going to work.’ These comments show 
persuasive reasoning because they do not only identify causes and express opposing 
arguments, but also because there is emotional depth in the use of strong language: ‘fooled’, 
‘brainwashed’ and ‘where the heck’. Similar rhetorical argumentation and discursive 
engagement also characterized Katarzyna’s use of repetitions: ‘I don’t think media is 
representing the situation well; I don’t think it’s helping people understand what’s going on; 
I don’t think it teaches people to think straight.’  
The feelings expressed alongside practical reasoning displayed frustration due to lack of 
information and action, loss of faith in the political class leading to bitterness and 
disappointment, betrayal leading to isolation. Johanna echoed some of these feelings in her 
assessment: ‘I think that I take issue with how the campaign was fought; I think it wasn’t very 
honest. I feel frustrated with the Remain campaign; I think they […] could’ve phrased it much 
more positively, they could’ve done a better job. I also feel that it was a mistake—a political 
mistake—to not set a different threshold [for the referendum results].’ Johanna showed 
practical political knowledge of UK and German referenda and used a blend of reasoned 
argumentation and emotional language for persuasive impact. Chiara took a similar stance: ‘I 
would have accepted if the result of the referendum was the result of a real and a normal 
discussion […] it was really more of a rage, big rage coming out of people.’ These views 
implicitly stated the solutions: more honest media, less selfish politicians, a choice based on 
correct information.  
Many participants conducted a surprisingly correct political analysis. In view of how crucial 
the Irish border issue had become during the Brexit negotiations, Doreen and Caitlin’s 
anticipation was prescient. Doreen thought that ‘Mrs May did really wrong when she said she 
would leave the single market because it will cost, I think it will cause, many troubles with 
Ireland and Northern Ireland.’ Caitlin also commented: ‘going into bed with the DUP 
[Democratic Unionist Party], that was an interesting one. If she [Theresa May] thought she 
was going to have trouble negotiating with 27 European countries, hmm […] I don’t honestly 
know what goes through these people’s heads.’ The use of ‘wrong’, ‘trouble/s’, ‘going into 
bed’ and the ironic ‘interesting’ show the peppering of reasoned political assessment with 
rhetorical pathos, in particular words (‘troubles’) that have ideological and historical baggage. 
In a similar vein, John, who has lived in the UK for twenty years but identified as ‘first and 
foremost Irish’, commended the peace process by saying ‘I’ve seen the peace process change 
things for Irish people – you don’t hear IRA jokes anymore – almost never […] we’ve sort of 
moved down the scale of people that the English don’t like.’ He thought that a possible border 
between Ireland and Northern Ireland was ‘going to come back to bite the UK government in 
the ass, because nobody in the North wants a hard border […] I can’t see them going to war 
over it. I can’t see that, but I think, reading correctly, they could kibosh the whole Brexit…the 
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fact that people in Northern Ireland voted 56 per cent Remain.’ Strong, albeit colloquial 
language, helped outline the political implications of Brexit from an Irish perspective, while 
also operating a polarisation of political stances. Reactive and cognitive engagement 
supported John’s subsequent discursive engagement with Brexit.  
Some of these strategies resounded online. Most diasporic groups online are usually 
organized around ethnic lines, and many serve a cultural role. However, after the referendum, 
they became politicized and civic in nature. Martha explained that ‘…because I’ve got many 
Greek friends here, and we have a WhatsApp group, so the day that they announced it, it was 
chaos. Like, we had something like nine hundred text messages on WhatsApp, because 
everyone was sending things or articles and, “Oh my god, what will we have to do?”’ In this 
case nationals of Greece and Cyprus bounded together to assess and find tailored solutions 
to an emerging political crisis. However, sometimes this led to a confused cacophony of 
voices: ‘a lot of these discussions, especially after the referendum and in the run up to the 
general election, seemed to have been done on Facebook. So, I’ve got people from all sorts 
of political backgrounds there and people posting this and people posting that, and of course, 
I get a very distorted view of the news and the media in that way,’ explained Johanna. Johanna 
confirmed nevertheless the political turn taken by diasporic groups on social media: ‘we’re 
quite a political group, we’re quite vocal, you know, talk about opinions and stuff.’  
The online discussions that took a political turn and invited a variety of opinions, also show 
the emergence of pro/re-active, cognitive and discursive engagement. This is evident in 
Johanna’s comments: ‘I wouldn’t describe myself as politically on the left or on the right; I’m 
a very pragmatic centralist—in the German sense, liberal, not in the British sense, but in the 
German sense […] in this country, the social cohesion has been broken, and I cannot really 
see any attempts at mending that. And it has to do with the political system of this major two-
party system and the lack of compromising and the lack of coalition. While, in Germany, we 
always have coalitions, we always somehow find a middle way.’ Johanna’s comparison 
between the German and British political systems reconfirms the EU nationals’ ability to 
conduct sophisticated political assessments and position themselves ideologically in 
opposition to the English majority. Johanna added: ‘So I thought, well, you know, you 
complain about an elite in Brussels that might not be democratic, but actually you’re being 
ruled by a very small elite from specific schools, specific universities, and there isn’t that 
much, you know, openness in that.’ The use of words such as ‘social cohesion’, ‘lack of 
compromising’, ‘broken’, ‘[lack of] openness’, are part of liberal rhetorics used to express 
oppositional attitudes via an indictment of right-wing politics and the British class system. It 
consists of a perfect example of political engagement through argumentation.  
A highly developed political attitude was also evidenced by Martha – one of the few EU 
nationals who could vote in the EU referendum due to her Cypriot nationality1 - who 
explained how she instrumentalized her political beliefs during the referendum: ‘So an 
                                            
1Until 2019, Commonwealth and EU citizens living in the UK could vote in the UK local elections. Irish and 
Commonwealth citizens have also been entitled to vote in referenda. 
(https://www.gov.uk/browse/citizenship/voting, last accessed 20 November 2018) 
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immigrant here would vote for Remain, and that’s why I did it. But on the other hand, I was 
feeling that maybe it’s a bit of a selfish way to see it, because I don’t really believe in the EU 
as it is today. […] most of the people that I know, that are left-wing, they voted for remain 
because, you know, for them, Brexit means racism…’  
Although instances of political action and active engagement were rare among our sample, 
Dagmar joined the Liberal Democrat Party, who was in her view ‘for Europe and in the face of 
uncertainty and horror’, and even ran as a candidate in the local elections. In Dagmar’s case, 
political attitudes became political action and micropolitics crossed into macropolitics, in a 
clear case of agency seeking, of finding solutions. This was mainly motivated by the 
‘uncertainty’ shared by most EU nationals post-Referendum. However, the use of the word 
‘horror’ is telling, because it reiterates the blending of reasoned arguments and logic, with 
emotional investment. As Fairclough and Fairclough (2011) point out, emotions are 
motivational. EU nationals engaged with the media and political agenda post-referendum and 
used a variety of discursive strategies, such as blaming, labelling and separation/polarization, 
because they were emotionally invested in the outcome of the Referendum. Pathos helped 
construct a persuasive rhetoric that supported an otherwise logical and reflexive political 
analysis. As a result, apart from reactive and cognitive engagements, EU nationals in the North 
West of England demonstrate discursive engagement, which is an aspect not yet explored by 
research on migrants’ political engagement. 
However, the reaction to the referendum result and the period after also led to alternative 
forms of engagement, which are discussed in the next section.  
 
Alternative Forms of Reaction: Mainstreaming and (Dis)engaging 
Some EU nationals in the North West cognitively and discursively engaged with mainstream 
attitudes with regards to migration. This reaction was motivated by the need to respond in 
some way to mainstream anti-immigration discourses that played a key role during the 
referendum campaign and its aftermath. Mainstream discourse on migration affected the 
way EU nationals perceived others, assessed their relationship with other minority groups and 
judged their own place in a hierarchy that included both the English majority and other non-
EU minorities. Some EU nationals criticized the way British citizens racialize and discriminate 
against others. Other EU nationals adopted the position of insiders who tried to fit in by 
disapproving of the bad behaviour displayed by other migrant groups. In both cases, the 
majority of the voices were Eastern European. As more recent arrivals who carried a clear 
immigrant label assigned by both political and media discourses, they would have been more 
sensitive to hierarchies.    
Agnieszka observed that anti-European attitudes in the UK may be caused by a lack of 
knowledge of other European cultures, in particular Eastern European: ‘I think it would be 
nice to have a better understanding […] I don’t think that there is that much about Eastern 
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European [cultures]. We kind of tend to concentrate on Asian people, the Muslim 
community.’ Agnieszka noticed a certain discrimination against Eastern Europeans, who had 
not been made the subject of integration policies, because they had been seen as proximate 
culturally and religiously and were not expected to settle permanently. She perceived a 
certain inequality in knowledge, interest and treatment and she partly blamed the outcome 
of the referendum on this lack of understanding of specificities and differences. This alleged 
inability of the English to correctly perceive ethnic ‘realities’ was also echoed by other 
participants: ‘maybe English guys think everybody is a terrorist,’ observed Andris. Edyta 
noticed a similar lack of adequate knowledge:  ‘British people thought - if we vote yes, then 
after people won’t come to this country for work and people will, [from] one day to another, 
leave […] they have no idea, for example, people from India and Pakistan that are not part of 
European Union, there’s nothing to stop them coming over […] that’s nothing to do with the 
European Union, so they don’t kind of understand really what does it mean, why they voted 
[this way].’ This view shows again an invested political assessment and use of logical 
reasoning. The reoccurrence of the word ‘think’ and its derivatives, assigned opinions judged 
to be erroneous to the British, in another instance of polarization.  
Amalia, on the other hand, noted that ‘all these refugees that came to Germany and France, 
they did some bad things. So, it [Brexit] is a good choice for the British people, because now 
it will be safer. The British chose to leave because of the refugee crisis. The crisis and the 
referendum happened at the same time.’ Amalia identified correctly the link between the 
Syrian refugee crisis and the anti-immigrationist discourses used during the Brexit campaign. 
Her views could be read as an internalization of some of these discourses (she uses the same 
language that includes ‘safe’ and ‘crisis’), but equally, they could be seen as an attempt to 
adopt majority views (mainstreaming) in a quest to belong. In a similar vein, Piroska said: ‘In 
the UK we support wars - the Middle East and Syria - so, if they do that, obviously you have 
to give something back. These people left their homes because of wars…’ Piroska used the 
deictic ‘we’ as a way of signaling her belonging to the majority group, coupled, in her case, 
with a tolerant attitude. Katarzyna, on the other hand, commented: ‘I think they should have 
done what Australia did and just be tough with it and not let anyone, like, not let everybody 
in; only let people in who can prove, you know, that they have—that they will improve the 
state of the county and not destroy it, you know?’ Katarzyna adopted, in this instance, the 
majority view, which called for tougher immigration controls to protect the UK from migrants 
who wanted to ‘destroy’ it. It is a case of adopting both the views and the discourse of the 
majority in a quest to belong, which displayed a different type of cognitive, psychologically 
motivated, engagement.  
 
Various forms of disengagement or emotional withdrawal were also revealed in the course of 
the project. They came in a variety of attitudes, from withdrawing from the conversation and 
refusing to commit views, to actively seeking not to stand out in the post-referendum 
environment or using distantiation strategies. These strategies were deployed by either highly 
integrated professionals, who had made a firm choice for the UK, or newer arrivals who felt 
too insecure to offer a political assessment. Disengagement and withdrawal have been 
observed in the literature before and are usually interpreted as a sign of insecurity or simply 
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an outcome of a previously disappointing political experience. As Jacobs and Tillie observed 
in relation to migrants, ‘psychological insecurity leads to personal disengagement, passivity, 
a defensive attitude and evasion of social contacts’ (Jacobs and Tillie 2011, 310, emphasis in 
the original). Bermudez (2010, 82), in her study of Colombians in London, found examples of 
migrants who refused to engage politically (through voting), with either the Colombian or the 
UK political systems, because of a ‘dislike’ of politics in general. Some participants in our 
project chose to overcompensate feelings of insecurity or disillusionment vis-à-vis politics 
with a commitment to fully integrate by applying for British citizenship or trying hard not to 
stand out. 
Although the data set is too small to make big generalizations, it appears that the more people 
felt British (and Eurosceptic) and the less they felt connected psychologically with their 
countries of origin, the more they were determined to blend in. Margot, for example, did not 
plan to return to France because her and her boyfriend loved British culture and they had 
succeeded professionally, so there was no economic incentive to return, while Stelian had 
ambivalent feelings towards his home country, Romania. In these cases, Brexit was just 
another hurdle to overcome and not a crisis, solved by applying for British citizenship. Yet 
these are also clear political choices and pro/re-active forms of engagement vis-à-vis the 
political situation.  
Some EU nationals in the North West totalled their gains and losses in a calculating rational 
way. Aleksi, though disappointed by Brexit, claimed Brexit actually bid his family time to make 
arrangements to move away: ‘Well, actually for us, in the short term, Brexit was the better 
choice. Because Cameron’s renegotiation with the EU would have removed free-movement 
rights from non-EU spouses immediately, in all of EU. So basically, my wife would have had 
no right to come to the UK…’ In this case, despondency was caused by the inability to influence 
or change the system. As many other EU nationals, Aleksi felt at the mercy of historical 
developments over which he had no control but made a cognitive, rational assessment of the 
situation and tried to focus on the positives. He moved to his wife’s country of origin months 
after the interview with him took place. In this case, Brexit was a catalyst for action leading 
to complete disengagement from the situation.  
Olivier’s anger was palpable in his comments: ‘People get the Government they deserve – it’s 
like the US has with Trump. People are uneducated, racist idiots, they don’t know what 
they’re doing.  Their fear and fear-mongers like Nigel Farage that tells them all sorts of bull 
shit and they believe that so … I think they got what they deserved.’ In this case, Olivier’s 
heightened emotions motivated a different form of disengagement. He strategically 
distantiated himself from the collective body. This separation allowed him to position himself 
outside the system, and his French passport offered him a possible exit option, which he was 
planning to eventually take. Despite a clear polarization of views, Olivier’s choices also show 
political engagement through a discourse of blame.  
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The variety of disengagement strategies reveals the diversity of the project’s demographics, 
but also the distinct experiences of migration and adaptation. For low skilled recently arrived 
and lacking good English Eastern Europeans, lack of engagement was a consequence of their 
immediate circumstances. Their lack of trust was due to unfortunate previous political 
experiences. For those already settled here, disengagement was more of a cognitive choice, 
often determined by rational ‘best scenario for me’ calculations. Consequently, these 
attitudes echo Ekman and Amnå’s (2012) active non-participation type.  
Both mainstreaming and (dis)engagement can be read within the same framework of 
practical cognitive reasoning - a political response that blends emotional reactions with 
reasoned calculations. Both strategies show reactive engagement with an emerging situation 
that affected people both emotionally and practically, inducing them to make choices and 
take stances. The resulting discourse became political when expressed but also when 
withheld. However, in contrast to the engagement observed in the preceding section, those 
EU nationals who reacted via mainstreaming or disengagement displayed more emotional, 
reactive and impulsive attitudes. This type of reactive engagement is evidenced by less 
informed political analysis, as well as offensive and aggressive language, showing a lot of 
insecurity. Although cognitive and proactive engagements can be found, the majority are 
reactive and reveal a preoccupation with individual circumstances at the expense of political 
solutions or group interests, thus lacking the practical reasoning and argumentation 
(Fairclough and Fairclough 2011) required for goal oriented political engagement. 
 
Conclusions 
This article has focused on the pro/re-active, cognitive and discursive engagements of EU 
nationals in the North West of England in the aftermath of the 2016 referendum. The clear 
polarization of British society (Curtice 2018), also evident in EU nationals’ language and 
discursive strategies, offered them the opportunity to sharpen their political knowledge, 
display critical reflexivity, political attitudes and ideological positions, and actively engage 
with the political process in search of agency.  
We have predominantly explored EU nationals’ discursive engagement, because this is an 
aspect not yet fully explored by research on migrants’ political engagement. Motivated by the 
Referendum outcome, EU nationals in the North-West used a variety of discursive strategies 
to make sense of the media and political agendas and engaged in a logical and reflexive 
political analysis, as well as more emotionally and psychologically prompted reactions. Our 
analysis of migrants’ mainstreaming and (dis)engagement also showed a more reactive 
political response that blended emotional reactions with personal calculations, at the expense 
of group political solutions. These (dis)engagements show a degree of diversity in the way EU 
nationals engaged politically, which we have labelled pro/re-active, cognitive and discursive, 
but which warrant further attention and conceptualization.  
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Future research needs to investigate how this agency seeking political engagement is 
operationalised long-term, as a consequence of Brexit. In particular, how a diverse group with 
various interests will be able to cultivate constitutional patriotism (see Habermas 1992, 1994 
and Müller 2007, in the context of post-national politics), based on rights, education and 
information, rather than on ethnic affiliation. So far, our own research has been able to 
establish that the ground has been laid for such developments, evident in EU nationals’ critical 
reflexivity, practical reasoning and persuasive rhetorics. Being critical of the media and 
political class, offering informed opinions or strategically choosing to withhold them, seeing 
events in a larger historical context and from the point of view of consequences, applying for 
British citizenship, choosing to leave the UK or becoming members of political parties, are all 
political acts that display a range of pro/re-active, cognitive and discursive engagements and 
active disengagements. We argue that it is important to chart these developing phenomena, 
as emerging political engagements can become a precursor to stronger political attitudes and 
potential action in post-Brexit Britain. 
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